ABSTRACT Wireless radio frequency identification (RFID) has been widely used as the core technology of the Internet of Things, but it also brings many potential security risks. In this paper, two typical RFID security authentication protocols are analyzed in depth. The results show that the two protocols have security risks, and two targeted attack methods are proposed. Next, two RFID security authentication protocols which can resist the DoS, replay, and tracing attacks are designed. The first protocol uses index grouping and dynamic renewal mechanism. Since the Rabin public key encryption algorithm verification only requires square and modulo operations, the second protocol introduces the public key encryption algorithm into the cost-sensitive RFID tag, and formally verifies the functionality of the proposed scheme by SPIN. Furthermore, the security of the protocol is proven by the BAN logic. The grouping index method can effectively improve the ability to locate tags in a large database and enhance the practicability of the protocol. The introduction of the Rabin public key algorithm improves the security of the protocol under the condition of cost control.
I. INTRODUCTION
As ''all-in-the-net'' age is coming, wireless radio frequency identification (RFID) has been utilized widely as the key technology of Internet of Things. The classical scenario applied of the RFID is that a central database stores the relevant information of tag, a reader reads and identifies tags without contact. The tag is the information carrier of identification object. In this scenario, the database server and the reader can adopt the most advanced encryption algorithm because of powerful computing capability, which is regarded as security channel. The channel between the tag and the reader is regarded as insecure channel due to the tag is sensitive to the cost of the high-security encryption algorithms, it is impossible to use the high-security encryption algorithms directly, such as RSA and AES, etc. Therefore, it often suffers the DoS, tracking, and replay attacks, etc. In recent years, with the wide spread of the RFID, the attacks aiming at the RFID system is diverse, and seriously hindered the promotion of the RFID technology. Then how to protect the privacy problems of the RFID is getting hotter.
The research shows that the RFID has two utility scenarios, Scenario I: the reader is related to the database directly.
The study on the security protocol is divided into two types: (1) one type is the low-cost security privacy protection protocol with low-cost operations such as AND, OR, XOR, and CRC, the disadvantage is poor security. ( 2) The other type is the high-cost RFID protocol which introduces the high-cost public key and symmetric encryption algorithm to guarantee the security of the protocol. The cost is seriously exceeded, which limits the promotion of such protocols. Scenario II: the readers and the database are separate, that is off-line work mode, which can extend the work scope of the identification system effectively. In the off-line situation, the reader needs to store a large amount of raw data of tags. The off-line mode has poorer security due to lack of real-time interaction with the central database, and the reader is vulnerable to information loss, tracing and DoS attacks. In this paper, we have a deep study on two representative literatures [1] , [2] . Analysis shows that there are security risks in them. The reason is as follows: (1) Scenario defects. Although the off-line solution increases the mobility of the RFID application range, it limits the real-time information renewal between the reader and the tag. (2) Protocol design defect. The protocol does not take into account the freshness of the variables, so that there will be the replay, DoS and tracing attacks. Based on the above two reasons, two aiming attack against the above protocols were proposed. And then we design two security authentication protocols which can resist the DoS, replay and tracing attacks of the RFID system. The scenarios of the paper: with the rapid development of the 4G and 5G network, the QoS of remote wireless network has a great development. And it can be applied in the remote secure communication between the reader and the database. The wireless communication technology extends the mobile range of the RFID tag, and allows the real-time data exchange between the tag and the database. In this scenario, we proposed two RFID security authentication protocols: the first protocol used grouping index and dynamic renewal mechanism; Since the Rabin public key encryption algorithm signature only requires square and modulo operations, the second protocol introduces the public key encryption algorithm into the cost-sensitive RFID tag, and formally verify the functionality of the proposed scheme by SPIN (Simple Promela Interpreter). The grouping index method can effectively improve the ability to locate tags in the large data base and enhance the practicability of the protocol. The dynamic update mechanism and the one-way hash function are introduced to reduce the replay, tracing and DoS attacks. In addition, the protocol introduces the Rabin public key encryption algorithm to improve the security with controllable costs. Furthermore, the security of the protocol was proven by BAN logic.
II. RELATED WORK
A lightweight RFID authentication protocol (abbreviation as protocol HB) based on LPN (learning parity with noise) [3] has been introduced in [4] , which achieves good results in terms of security and cost control. Juels and Weis modified the HB protocol with aim to get the HB+ protocol [5] , but the HB+ protocol is insecure to the man-in-the-middle attack with disguising legal reader. Then Bringer proposed HB++ protocol with aim to the defect of the HB+ [6] . Three ultralightweight authentication protocols: M 2 AP, EMAP, LMAP, which are regarded as ultra-lightweight two-way authentication protocols cluster has been presented in [7] - [9] , which is a good exploration in terms of phases dealing and cost control. An ultra lightweight authentication protocol (abbreviation in SASI) in [10] only uses AND, Shift and XOR operations to simplify the cost to meet the design demand of the lowcost RFID system. However, the forward security feature of the protocol is poor. Two methods of DoS attacks for the SASI protocol have been proposed in [11] . Inspired by the SASI protocol, the Gossamer protocol has been proposed in [12] , which introduced the MixBits() function. However, the design of the protocol is flawed and there is no rigorous theoretical proof. In 2010, Eslamamal et al. [13] gave a passive attack method for the Gossamer protocol. The UAPP protocol has been introduced in [14] , which has achieved excellent results in cost control and security performance. However, the recently research results show that the UAPP protocol is easy to be attacked by DoS. A Dos attack can successfully implement within a certain probability range for the UAPP protocol with a bit-tampering asynchronous attack method has been reported in [15] . An ultralightweight mutual-authentication protocol UMAPSS based on secret sharing has been introduced in [16] , which includes mechanisms for double verification, session control, mutual authentication, and dynamic update to enhance security and provide a robust privacy protection. In 2018, Rad et al. [17] gave an attack method for the distance-bounding protocols MP and KA, and proved that these protocols are vulnerable against terrorist fraud attack and force attack. Finally, they improved these two schemes. A new radio-frequency identification authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography to eliminate these vulnerabilities has been introduced in [18] . The protocol achieves a set of security properties as mutual authentication, anonymity, confidentiality, forward security, location privacy, resistance of man-in-the-middle attack, resistance of replay attack and resistance of impersonation attack. An RFID authentication architecture for distributed IoT applications and the future smart city environments has been presented in [19] , which provides forward secrecy, anonymity and untraceability of RFID-tag, and secure localization.
III. REVIEW OF USI SCHEME A. REVIEW OF THE USI SCHEME
The USI scheme, an off-line RFID security protocol, has been proposed in [2] , which enhanced the mobility of readers. Study shows that the protocol is vulnerable to tracing attacks. The USI scheme includes two sections: (1) authentication between the reader and the tag; (2) authentication between the reader and the database. We lay more emphasis on the authentication stage between the reader and the tag.
Get the correct one and take its id as id i . The storage content of tag according to the scheme design is:
The information stored in R 1 and R 2 is as follows:
The reader sends query signal which includes < r i , n 1 >=< 1101, 1000>. The T 1 sends back n j = 2001, h(f (r cd , t 1 )) m = 0101010101, and further computes h(f (r i , t j )||n i ||n j ) ⊕ id i = h(f (1101, 0001)||1000||2001)⊕0001=0010103121 and sends to the reader. Analysis shows that although the introduction of r cd can reduce the probability of tracking attacks, it can still not completely overcome the tracking attack. Therefore, the scheme is not as secure as that the author claimed.
B. TRACING ATTACK METHOD AIMING AT THE SERVER INDEPENDENT AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 1) ATTACK METHOD I
With the development of electronic analysis technology, attackers can know the f () and h() functions by analyzing chip circuit. The method is based on the assumption that the attacker knows the f () and h() functions. In the second step, the tag returns h(f (r i , t j )||n i ||n j ) ⊕ id i as the identification between the tag and the reader. The attack scenario is like this: in an important meeting, all participants will be identified by the RFID tag. There are two people attending the meeting and each person wears an RFID tag, in addition, there are two readers at the meeting place. We can quickly identify the owner of the tag and track them by the following method.
The storage of tags:
The storage of readers:
where r 1 , r 2 are identification tokens of readers, r cd = 1000.
When R 1 sends < r 1 , n i1 >=< 0101, 1010>, T 1 replies n j1 = 1001, h(f (r cd , t 1 )) m = h(f (1000, 0010)) m = 0101010101, and
, and
, n j2 , V 1 , V 2 are known, we can crack the value of x by computing off-line (the time may not be too long.). The f (r, t) = h(r||t), h(r||t) is one-way hash function, length of which is fixed as l, and we can get x = f (r i , t j ) = 1010100011 in the computation complexity of 2 l .
After getting the value of the f (r i , t j ) of the T j , we can distinguish the tag quickly because the value of the f (r i , t j ) keeps the same.
If the R 1 sends two queries < r 1 , n i3 >=< 0101, 3010>, < r 1 , n i4 >=< 0101, 4010>, the T x replies:
If the amount of readers and tags is more than 2, we can establish a rainbow table K of T j and f (r i , t j ), in which we can identify the value of tag token identification tuple off-line. Thus we can replace x with characteristic value of a special tuple, and complete the tracing identification instantly.
The h(f (r cd , t j )) m is still can be seen as the only token of a tag because it contains the secret key of the tag. The h(f (r cd , t j )) m is the first m bits of the access control list and has multiple matching results. Because the possibility of h(f (r cd , t j )) is 2 l , that of h(f (r cd , t j )) m is 2 m , then the minimum conflict area is 2 l−m . Suppose B is the conflict probability, then B > 2 l−m . A malicious R sends two random numbers n 1 , n 2 to T 1 . If B is very small, the h(f (r cd , t j )) m can locate a tag directly. If B is big, the attacker can send multiple queries to locate the tag. If a malicious R sends three query signals, the tracing probability will be decreased to B 2 , four to B 3 , and so on, until B n is decreased to small enough to distinguish the specific tag, so tracing attack is possible.
IV. OUR PROTOCOL
The nature defects of Literature [2] are as follows: (1) gives a good inspiration in improving the search speed of the database. With the enlightenment of these two literature, two RFID security authentication schemes are presented in this paper, which introduce the dynamic renewal mechanism, index grouping and Rabin public key encryption algorithm to ensure the practicality and anti-attack ability.
A. SCHEME I -INTRODUCES HASH FUNCTION, DYNAMIC MECHANISM, INDEX GROUPING INTO RFID SECURITY AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
The practical scenario of the scheme is: the reader and the database use wireless remote communication technology, such as the 4G, and cooperates with the high cost encryption algorithms. Every tag has three secret keys, one index grouping, one hash function and one random number generator. The database also contains three current update keys and one group index number. Besides, in order to prevent the DoS attacks, the database contains three last successful authentication key groups and one last successful authentication index grouping number. If the RFID system is subjected to a DoS attack, the authentication can be completed with the last successful authentication key. Table 1 shows all notations used in the protocol. Suppose tags set of the database is T ={t 11 , t 12 , t 13 , . . . , t 1n , t 21 . . . t 2n , . . . , t m1 , . . . , t mn }, g 1 is the index of {t 11 , t 12 , t 13 , . . . , t 1n }, g 2 is the index of {t 21 , t 22 , t 23 , . . . , t 2n }, g m is the index of {t m1 , t m2 , t m3 , . . . , t mn }. The total amount of tags in the database is m × n, the value of m, n can be adjusted. When the m becomes smaller, the n will become larger. If the number of tags in each group increases, the positioning speed of the first round will increase, but the positioning speed of the second round will become slow. Therefore, if the values of m and n are properly adjusted, the positioning speed will be optimal, which is significantly better than the exhaustive search and enhances the practicability of the protocol.
B. AUTHENTICATION PROCESS OF SCHEME I
The scheme divides into 3 parts:
1) The first stage: grouping location stage
The hash(g i ) ∈ {hash(g 1 ), hash(g 2 ), . . . , hash(g i ) }, if we can find the group index equal to the hash(g i ) in the database, we can initially determine the response T in this group.
2) The second stage: authentication stage R → T : Furthermore, the second comparison will be performed in {t i1 , t i2 , t i3 , . . . , t in }. If the hash(Key h ⊕ g i ⊕ n 1 ) is equal to the response value, the authentication is successful, otherwise the authentication fails. We perform a second query in the conflict tag set to solve this problem, but it is a detailed issue and will not be discussed here. If the authentication from the T to the R passes, the R generates random number n 2 , computes hash(Key m ⊕ n 2 ), n 2 and sends to the tag.
T → R: If the value of the hash(Key m ⊕ n 1 ) transmitted by the reader is equal to the value calculated by the tag, the authentication from the T to the R succeeds. And then the tag generates n 3 , computes hash(Key l ⊕ n 2 ) ⊕ n 3 , and sends them to the reader. The reader extracts n 3 to update the secret key, calculates the value of hash(Key l ⊕ n 2 ) ⊕ n 3 with the information stored in the database. If it is equal to the value passed by the tag, the authentication from the T to the R succeeds.
3) The third stage: index grouping and secret key renewal stage VOLUME 7, 2019 After the authentication from the R to the T succeeds, the value of t i is updated to key x =hash(key x ⊕ n 2 ⊕ n 3 ), t i ∈ {g i }, t i ∈ ∀g j , j = n 3 mod m. Similarly, after the authentication from the T to the R succeeds, the value of index grouping is updated to key old 
. The actual authenticating process is shown in the Fig. 1 .
C. DoS ATTACK ANALYSIS
The DoS attacks divide into interception DoS attack, three times cheat DoS attack and bit-tampering DoS attack. The intercepting DoS attack is that the attacker forcibly blocks the communication process between the tag and the reader to make the authentication two sides cannot keep the key update make the reader update the secret key, but the tag does not update the secret key. Although the reader uses a dual secret key backup mechanism, the attacker can skillfully destroy the consistency of the secret keys of the communication parties by using the three times cheat asynchronous attack to achieve the purpose of hindering subsequent authentication. The more detailed attack steps are described in [10] . Bit-tampering DoS attack, which uses the coupling between transfer variables to change one or more bits of a particular variable to infer the affected bit in another variable. If we can't determine the location affected, we can use the guessing technique to make the illegal information pass the authentication. After the authentication, the tag and the reader will update the secret key with the wrong information, so that the next authentication will be performed abnormally. The more detailed attack steps are described in [15] .
Pointing at the intercepting DoS attack, the scheme applies double secret key and double index copy mechanism in the database. If communication is intercepted, the database renewal secret key will be key old x = key new x , key new
, while tag secret key still is key x = hash(key x ⊕ n 2 ⊕ n 3 ), g i , it can use the last time {key old x , g old i }∈ R, {key x , g i }∈ T to complete the authentication successfully. Thus, the scheme can block the DoS attacks. Pointing at the three times cheat asynchronous attack, the analysis shows that the protocol being attacked generally has retransmission defects. The reason for the retransmission defect is that the freshness of the variable is poor in the communication process, so the attacker can easily intercept and replay the communication information. In the proposed protocol each communication step of the protocol introduces a random number, and encrypts with the hash one-way function to ensure the freshness of the information. The secret key and the group index are also updated after each successful authentication. So the scheme can prevent the three times cheat asynchronous attack efficiently. Aiming at bittampering asynchronous attack, analysis shows that the reason for this type attack is that the coupling between communication variables is too strong. For example, we transmit A = n 2 and B = ROR(key m ⊕ n 2 ) to complete the authentication from the reader to the tag, during the communication process, in which the ROR is a recycling shift bit function. If we flip a bit in n 2 , a bit of B will be changed correspondingly. Although we don't know which one is changed, if B is kbit, we can use guessing technology to pass the authentication within O(2 k ) time complexity. After that, the tag will update the secret key with the wrong n 2 , which will cause the communication authentication failure in the next time. The protocol proposed in this paper introduces a one-way hash function and uses the random number to maintain freshness, which can effectively guarantee the integrity of information. Because the characteristic of the hash function with small change in the input parameters leading to a huge change in the output variables, which can greatly reduce the coupling between the variables, so that the attacker cannot implement the bit-tampering asynchronous attack.
D. TRACING ATTACK ANALYSIS
In order to analyze tracing attack carefully, the P is used to indicate the protocol to be executed, superscript run is used to indicate the running process of the protocol, and #θ is used to indicate the unique identifier of each query information, time run#θ is used to represent the value of the variable θ during the specific execu- run i , time run j ) = φ ⇒ ¬(∃t ∈ Tracing(P)). In this scheme, the important exchange information is hash(g i ), hash(Key⊕g i )⊕n 1 from the tag to the reader. Since the hash function is unidirectional and the protocol uses dynamic key update technology, g i and Key x will be renewed after every successful authentication. Besides random numbers have been inserted into communication process, it also improves anti-attack ability. The anti-tracking capability analysis process is as follows. The attacker sends the query information twice, the first time is #θ1, and the second time is #θ 2.
The first exchange information of query includes:
The second exchange information of query includes: The Rabin is a symmetric encryption algorithm, which is as secure as RSA. The theoretical basis of both is the difficulty of decomposition of a large number. However, the Rabin encryption algorithm has been shown to be able to reduce to large number decomposition, but whether RSA can be reduced to large number decomposition has not been proven. The principle of the Rabin encryption algorithm is as follows [20] :
Theorem I: n = p.q, p and q are different odd prime numbers, if (x, n) = l, then
≡ a mod n, then call ais the quadratic remainder of modulus n, otherwise non-quadratic remainder. We use Q n as quadratic remainder set of modulus n, and Q n is the quadratic non-remainder set modulus n.
Thermo II: Suppose x ∈ Q n , n = p.q is a Blum integer, then x (n−p−q+5)/8 mod n is the square root of x mod n.
Thermo III: J n = {a ∈ Z * n |( n a ) = 1},Q n = J n -Q n (denotes modulus n is square roots set), x ∈ J n , n = p.q, is a Blum
According to the China Remainder Theorem, every formula gets four solutions. But the solution from the encrypted text is not the sole. If we want to get a unique solution, we can get a unique solution by adding additional information after the plaintext, such as the identification of sender, identification of receiver and time stamp. Furthermore, we can find out the sole solution from many solutions according to appendix information.
Solution process is as follows: We choose two large prime numbers p and q randomly, satisfying p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4, that is, the two prime can be expressed as 4k + 3, compute n = p × q. Setting n as public key K pub , p, q as the secret keys K Pri . When encrypting, f ≡ x 2 mod n, where m is the plain text group, and c is the cipher text group corresponding to m. When decrypting, the equation x 2 ≡ f mod n is solved, which is equal to solve the following equation set.
If both p and q choose prime number of 3 (mod 4), then the square roots of f mod n are as follows: Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, it is found that the integers a, and b satisfy a · p + b · q = 1. The values of a and b can be calculated during the key generation phase and used repeatedly in the in the phase of the key generation.
• Four square roots of f mod n are ±x(mod n), ±y(mod n) Research shows that the Rabin public key encryption algorithm has a very significant feature, the computational complexity of the encryption and decryption process is asymmetric. The encryption process only requires square and modulo operations, while the decryption process requires complex exponential calculations. The asymmetry of encryption and decryption process is very similar to the structure of the RFID system. In the RFID system, the reader's computational capability is strong enough to undertake large computational tasks, while the RFID tag's computational capability is weak, so it can only perform limited calculations.
Based on this, we propose a two-way RFID security authentication protocol that introduces the public key Rabin encryption algorithm. The encryption part of the protocol, which is completed by the RFID tag, requires only one square and modulo operations. The decryption part is done by the reader, which effectively solves the problem of computing capability weak of the RFID tag. And it raises the grade of RFID security authentication to the public key level.
2) PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
The public key of the tag is K Pub , the private key is K Prip . The public key of the server is K Ser__Pub . The specific description of the protocol is as follows:
The tag receives query, and generates a random number n 1 ; computes m 1 = n 1 ⊕ Key h , and encrypts n 1 and (IDS⊕n 1 ) with the server's public key K Ser_Pub , the ciphertext is A = n 2 1 mod K Ser_Pub , B = (IDS⊕n 1 ) 2 modK Ser_Pub ; encrypts the m 1 with the tag's public key K Pub , the ciphertext is C = m 2 1 mod K Pub ; sends A, B and C to the reader.
• The reader receives A, B, C and sends them to the server. The server decrypts A and B with its own private key K Ser __Pub to obtain the cipher text n 1 and (IDS ⊕ n 1 ); computes IDS = n 1 ⊕ (IDS ⊕ n 1 ) to obtain the IDS and retrieves the database to obtain the tag's private key and shared secret keys; decrypts C with tag's private key to obtain the cipher text • The secret renewal process is the same as the first protocol. The Protocol 2 can effectively prevent the DoS, replay and tracking attacks with the dynamic update mechanism. The detailed analysis process will be given later. In addition, if we want to improve the search speed of the IDS, the group indexing mechanism can be introduced. The authentication process of the protocol is shown in the fig. 2 .
3) SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
The protocol SPIN simulation model is shown in Fig. 3 . In the simulation model, we set IDS=1323, K ser_pri = {p = 7, q = 11} (private key of the database), K ser_pub = 77 (public key of the database), key h = 12321, key m = 13139, key l = 16651, a = 8, b = −5, K pri = {p 1 = 19, q 1 = 23} (private key of the tag), K pub = 437 (public key of the tag), n 1 = 37 (A = n 2 1 mod K ser_pub ). According to the Rabin algorithm we can deduce a · p
For example, the decryption process of n 1 is as follows: A = n 2 1 mod K ser_pub = 60, n 1 = 37 = 100101 = 1001|| 01 (the 1st and 2nd bits are the same as the 3rd and 4th bits to confirm the unique solution). Then x = 37, y = 24 are calculated with the formula, the four roots are 37, −37, 26 and −26. The n 1 is a positive integer and the last two bits are overlapping, so x = 37 is the only solution. The decryption process of the B and C is the same (B = 71, C = 77). In the simulation, the attacker tries to query tag, then the tag replies encrypted A, B and C to it. Due to no secret key, the attacker cannot complete the decryption process, the attack is failed. The result of the SPIN simulation shows that the authentication process of the tag only performs a square multiplication and mod n operations. The analysis shows that the proposed protocol can complete high security authentication based on the public key encryption algorithm with low cost.
F. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) SECURITY FORMAL VERIFICATION WITH BAN LOGIC
The security formal verification with BAN Logic is as follow:
Result4: Server {n 1 }K Ser_Pub , {IDS ⊕ n 1 }K Ser_Pub Result5:
At this point, the server can query the database according to the IDS to obtain the relevant information of the tag. In the process of the certification, the IDS is encrypted and blended with random number, which can effectively avoid tracking attacks.
Result7: Tag
Result9 and result10 complete the authentication process from the server to the tag. The tag believes that the variable D is sent by the server. Then the server and the tag update secret keys. Random numbers and symmetric encryption algorithms are introduced into the protocol to effectively prevent the tracking attack. Only the square and modulo operations are used in the tag to increase the communication security to the public key encryption level within a controllable cost range.
2) RESISTS TO DoS ATTACKS
Before analyzing the DoS attack, we analyze the replay attack first, because replay attack is the basis of the DoS attack. In the replay attack, the attacker intercepts the information in the unsecured channel, and retransmits the historical information after analysis to pass the authentication. In the protocol, the changed variables include A, B, C, D.
Because these variables renewal process all include random numbers. After the authentication is successful, all the secret key information is updated with the random number, so it can effectively resist the replay attack. The essence of resisting the DoS attacks is that the protocol has good ability to resist the replay attacks and reduce the correlation of communication variables. The protocol is good at resisting replay attack which has been analyzed before. About the coupling relationship between variables, our protocol uses the public key signature twice during the verification process. The public key cryptography algorithm is irreversible without knowing the secret key, and its security can be reduced to the NP-Hard problem of the large integer decomposition. Hence the protocol can resist the DoS attack efficiently.
V. COST ANALYSIS
The focus of this paper is not to minimize cost. Instead, the public key encryption algorithm is introduced to improve the security to public key encryption hierarchy. Therefore, the cost of our protocol is slightly higher than the lowcost RFID protocol that only employs AND, OR, XOR, and SHIFT operations. The security cost of RFID tags is within 5000-10000 logic gates. The second scheme introduces the Rabin encryption algorithm whose verification process only requires square and modulo operations. The protocol uses a pipelined idea and parallel computing technology to save cost. Moreover, the shift register is employed to implement the data shift function.
One 1024 bit large number multiplying unit is designed as follows: An 8×1024 bit multiplication unit is designed with shift addition, which can perform parallel calculations by four 8×1024 bit multiplication units to complete 1024 bit large number multiplication operation. The multiplier uses four 8×1024 bit multiplier units, three 8-bit adders and one 8-bit adder. Each 8 × 1 024 bit multiplier unit consists of an 8-bit multiplier and a 16-bit addition. Analysis shows that an 8-bit multiplier requires 528 logic gates and a 16-bit adder requires 165 logic gates, so an 8×1 024 bit multiplier unit requires 693 logic gates. The analysis results show that the large multiplier requires a total of 3080 logic gates, which applies to the resource-limited RFID tag. As for the mod operation, the main cost is a 32×32 bit multiplication unit and a 32 × 512 bit multiplication unit, which can be completed by the previous 1024 bit large number multiplying unit without additional logic gates.
The cost of common hash functions, symmetric encryption algorithms, asymmetric encryption algorithms and the improved Rabin encryption algorithm are shown in table 2. The improved Rabin encryption algorithm requires only 3080 logic gates. So we can conclude that the simple hash and the improved Rabin algorithm are suitable for the lowcost RFID tags. The main contribution of this paper is also to use the features of Rabin encryption to improve the security of RFID to the level of public key encryption.
VI. CONCLUSION
The paper analyzed the advantages and shortages of the recent classical RFID security authentication protocols, gave two tracing attack ways aiming at literature [2] , and designed two RFID security authentication protocols based on the above analysis. The protocol scenario is that the reader uses the 4G, 5G technology to remotely connect with the database to enhance the mobility of the RFID system. In addition, the database and tag information is updated in real time to resist the DoS, replay, and tracking attacks. Furthermore, the second protocol introduces the Rabin encryption algorithm, whose verification process only requires square and modulo operations to raise the security grade of the RFID protocol to the public key level. Finally, we performed a simulation on the protocol with the SPIN. The research shows that the protocol can effectively resist the DoS, replay, and tracking attacks.
